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  • The Day of Remembrance and Sorrow is the day of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Attack of Hitler Germany on the USSR June 22, 1941 early day

    The Day of Remembrance and Sorrow is the day of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.  Attack of Hitler Germany on the USSR June 22, 1941 early day

    Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption Semyon Timoshenko and Georgy Zhukov knew everything, but took the secrets to the grave

    Until the very beginning of the war and in the first hours after it, Joseph Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack.

    He learned that the Germans were crossing the border and bombing Soviet cities at about 4 a.m. on June 22 from Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov.

    According to Zhukov’s “Memoirs and Reflections,” the leader did not react to what he heard, but only breathed heavily into the phone, and after a long pause, he limited himself to ordering Zhukov and the People’s Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko to go to a meeting in the Kremlin.

    In a prepared but undelivered speech at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in May 1956, Zhukov argued that Stalin forbade opening fire on the enemy.

    At the same time, in May-June, Stalin secretly transferred 939 trains with troops and equipment to the western border, called up 801 thousand reservists from the reserves under the guise of training, and on June 19, by secret order, he reorganized the border military districts into fronts, which was always done and exclusively a few days before the start of hostilities.

    “The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the concentration from June 1 to July 10, 1941. The disposition of troops was influenced by the offensive nature of the planned actions,” says the collective monograph “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions” published by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 1992.

    A legitimate question arises: what was the cause of the tragedy of June 22? Usually referred to as "mistakes" and "miscalculations" of the Soviet leadership. But upon careful examination, some of them turn out to be not naive delusions, but the consequence of thoughtful measures with the aim of preparing a pre-emptive strike and subsequent offensive actions Vladimir Danilov, historian

    “There was surprise, but only tactical. Hitler was ahead of us!” - Vyacheslav Molotov said to the writer Ivan Stadnyuk in the 1970s.

    “The trouble was not that we had no plans - we had plans! - but that the suddenly changed situation did not allow us to carry them out,” reported Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky in an article written for the 20th anniversary of the Victory, but which was published only in the early 90s -X.

    Not “the traitor Rezun,” but the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmud Gareev, pointed out: “If there were plans for defensive operations, then the groupings of forces and means would be located completely differently, the management and echeloning of material reserves would be structured differently. But this was not done in the border military districts."

    “Stalin’s main miscalculation and his guilt lay not in the fact that the country was not prepared for defense (it did not prepare for it), but in the fact that it was not possible to accurately determine the moment. A preemptive strike would have saved our Fatherland millions of lives and, perhaps, would have led much earlier to the same political results that the country, ruined, hungry, and having lost the color of the nation, achieved in 1945,” believed the director of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician Andrei Sakharov.

    Clearly aware of the inevitability of a clash with Germany, the leadership of the USSR until June 22, 1941 did not see itself in the role of a victim, did not wonder with a sinking heart “whether they will attack or not,” but worked hard to start the war at a favorable moment and carry it out “smallly.” blood on foreign territory." Most researchers agree with this. The difference is in details, dates and, mainly, in moral assessments.

    Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption The war broke out unexpectedly, although a premonition was in the air

    On this tragic day, on the eve and immediately after it, amazing things happened that did not fit into either the logic of preparation for defense or the logic of preparation for an offensive.

    There is no explanation for them based on documents and testimonies of participants in the events, and it is unlikely that one will appear. There are only more or less plausible guesses and versions.

    Stalin's dream

    Around midnight on June 22, having agreed and authorized Tymoshenko and Zhukov to send a controversial document known as “Directive No. 1” to the border districts for their signatures, the leader left the Kremlin for the Near Dacha.

    When Zhukov called with a report of the attack, the guard said that Stalin was sleeping and did not order to wake him up, so the chief of the general staff had to shout at him.

    The widespread opinion that the USSR was waiting for an attack by the enemy, and only then planning an offensive, does not take into account that in this case the strategic initiative would be given into the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops would be placed in obviously unfavorable conditions Mikhail Meltyukhov, historian

    Saturday June 21st passed in incredible tension. There were a stream of reports from the border that the approaching roar of engines could be heard from the German side.

    After the Führer's order was read out to the German soldiers before the formation at 13:00, two or three communist defectors swam across the Bug to warn the "camaraden": it will begin tonight. By the way, another mystery is that we know nothing about these people who should have become heroes in the USSR and the GDR.

    Stalin spent the day in the Kremlin in the company of Timoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Mehlis, analyzing incoming information and discussing what to do.

    Let's say he doubted the data he was receiving and never took concrete steps. But how could you go to bed without waiting for the ending, when the clock was ticking? Moreover, a person who had the habit, even in a calm everyday environment, of working until dawn and sleeping until lunch?

    Plan and directive

    At the headquarters of the Soviet troops in the western direction, up to and including the divisions, there were detailed and clear cover plans, which were stored in “red packets” and were subject to execution upon receipt of the appropriate order from the People's Commissar of Defense.

    Cover plans are different from strategic war plans. This is a set of measures to ensure the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces in the event of a threat of a preemptive strike by the enemy (occupying fortifications with personnel, moving artillery to tank-threat areas, raising aviation and air defense units, intensifying reconnaissance).

    The introduction of a cover plan is not yet a war, but a combat alert.

    During the one and a half hour meeting that began at 20:50 on June 21, Stalin did not allow Timoshenko and Zhukov to take this necessary and obvious step.

    The directive completely confused the troops on the border Konstantin Pleshakov, historian

    In return, the famous “Directive No. 1” was sent to the border districts, which, in particular, said: “During June 22-23, a surprise attack by the Germans is possible. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions […] at the same time be in full combat readiness to meet a possible attack […] other measures should not be carried out without special orders.”

    How can one “meet the blow” without carrying out the measures provided for in the cover plan? How to distinguish provocation from attack?

    Late mobilization

    Incredible, but true: general mobilization in the USSR was announced not on the day the war began, but only on June 23, despite the fact that every hour of delay gave the enemy additional advantages.

    The corresponding telegram from the People's Commissar of Defense arrived at the Central Telegraph at 16:40 on June 22, although since the early morning the state leadership, perhaps, had not had a more pressing task.

    At the same time, the short text, just three sentences long, written in dry clerical language, did not contain a word about the treacherous attack, defense of the homeland and sacred duty, as if it were a routine conscription.

    Theater and concert evening

    The command of the Western Special Military District (by that time actually the Western Front), led by Army General Dmitry Pavlov, spent Saturday evening at the Minsk Officers' House at a performance of the operetta “Wedding in Malinovka.”

    Memoir literature confirms that the phenomenon was widespread and widespread. It’s hard to imagine that big commanders in that atmosphere would go out and have fun without orders from above.

    There is numerous evidence of the cancellation on June 20-21 of previously issued orders to increase combat readiness, the unexpected announcement of days off, and the dispatch of anti-aircraft artillery to training camps.

    Anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army and the 6th Mechanized Corps of the Western OVO met the war at a training ground 120 km east of Minsk.

    The orders to the troops to send artillery to the firing ranges and other ridiculous instructions in that situation caused complete bewilderment of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky

    “The regiment was declared a day off on Sunday. Everyone was happy: they had not rested for three months. On Saturday evening, the command, pilots and technicians went to their families,” recalled former pilot of the 13th Bomber Aviation Regiment Pavel Tsupko.

    On June 20, the commander of one of the three ZapOVO air divisions, Nikolai Belov, received an order from the district air force commander to put the division on combat readiness, cancel vacations and dismissals, disperse equipment, and at 16:00 on June 21, it was canceled.

    “Stalin tried to make it clear by the very condition and behavior of the troops in the border districts that calm, if not carelessness, reigns in our country. As a result, instead of misleading the aggressor with skillful disinformation actions regarding the combat readiness of our troops, we actually reduced it to an extremely low degree,” the former chief of the operational department of the 13th Army headquarters, Sergei Ivanov, was perplexed.

    The ill-fated regiment

    But the most incredible story happened in the 122nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, which covered Grodno.

    On Friday, June 20, high-ranking officials from Moscow and Minsk arrived at the unit, and at 6 pm on Saturday, an order was announced to the personnel: to remove the I-16 fighters from the I-16 fighters and send weapons and ammunition to the warehouse.

    Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption It took several hours to reinstall the removed machine guns on the I-16.

    The order was so wild and inexplicable that the pilots started talking about treason, but they were silenced.

    Needless to say, the next morning the 122nd Air Regiment was completely destroyed.

    The Soviet Air Force grouping in the western direction consisted of 111 air regiments, including 52 fighter regiments. Why did this one attract so much attention?

    What's happened?

    “Stalin, contrary to obvious facts, believed that this was not a war, but a provocation of individual undisciplined units of the German army,” Nikita Khrushchev said in a report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

    The obsessive thought of some kind of provocation, apparently, was indeed present in Stalin’s mind. He developed it both in “Directive No. 1” and at the first meeting in the Kremlin after the start of the invasion, which opened at 05:45 on June 22. He did not give permission to return fire until 06:30, until Molotov announced that Germany had officially declared war on the USSR.

    The now deceased St. Petersburg historian Igor Bunich claimed that a few days before the start of the war, Hitler sent a secret personal message to Stalin warning that some Anglophile generals might try to provoke a conflict between the USSR and Germany.

    Stalin allegedly remarked with satisfaction to Beria that this was impossible in our country; we had brought order to our army.

    True, it was not possible to find the document in German or Soviet archives.

    Israeli researcher Gabriel Gorodetsky explains Stalin's actions by panic fear and the desire to not give Hitler a reason for aggression at any cost.

    Stalin really drove away every thought from himself, but not about war (he was no longer thinking about anything else), but about the fact that Hitler at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him Mark Solonin, historian

    “Stalin drove away any thought about war, he lost the initiative and was practically paralyzed,” writes Gorodetsky.

    Opponents object that Stalin was not afraid in November 1940, through the mouth of Molotov, to harshly demand from Berlin Finland, Southern Bukovina and the base in the Dardanelles, and in early April 1941 to conclude an agreement with Yugoslavia that infuriated Hitler and at the same time had no practical meaning.

    Demonstration of defensive preparations cannot provoke a potential enemy, but it can make you think again.

    “When dealing with a dangerous enemy, we should probably show him, first of all, our readiness to fight back. If we had demonstrated to Hitler our true power, he might have refrained from war with the USSR at that moment,” the experienced staff officer believed Sergei Ivanov, who later rose to the rank of army general.

    According to Alexander Osokin, Stalin, on the contrary, deliberately pushed Germany to attack in order to appear in the eyes of the world as a victim of aggression and receive American help.

    Critics point out that the game in this case turned out to be very dangerous, Lend-Lease did not have a self-sufficient meaning in the eyes of Stalin, and Roosevelt was guided not by the kindergarten principle of “who started?”, but by the interests of US national security.

    Shoot first

    Another hypothesis was put forward by historians Keistut Zakoretsky and Mark Solonin.

    In the first three weeks of June, Timoshenko and Zhukov met with Stalin seven times.

    According to Zhukov, they called for immediately bringing the troops into some incomprehensible “state of full readiness for war” (preparations were already carried out continuously and at the limit of strength), and, according to a number of modern researchers, for a preemptive strike without waiting for the completion of the strategic deployment .

    Truth is stranger than fiction, because fiction must stay within the bounds of probability, but truth cannot. Mark Twain

    Zakoretsky and Solonin believe that in the face of Berlin’s obvious aggressive intentions, Stalin did listen to the military.

    Presumably at a meeting on June 18 with the participation of Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov and Malenkov, it was decided to start a preventive war not sometime, but on June 22, the longest daylight hours of the year. Not at dawn, but later.

    The war with Finland was preceded by. According to researchers, the war with Germany should also have begun with a provocation - a raid on Grodno by several Junkers and Dorniers purchased from the Germans. At the hour when residents have breakfast and go out into the streets and parks to relax after a week of work.

    The propaganda effect would have been deafening, and Stalin could well have sacrificed several dozen civilians in the higher interests.

    The version explains almost everything quite logically.

    And Stalin’s refusal to believe that the Germans would strike almost simultaneously (such coincidences simply do not happen, and what Hitler intends to do in the following days is no longer important).

    And mobilization began on Monday (the decree was prepared in advance, but they did not bother to redo it in the confusion of the first morning of the war).

    There are two wills in the field Russian proverb

    And the disarmament of the fighters based near Grodno (so that one of the “vultures” would not be accidentally shot down over Soviet territory).

    The deliberate complacency made the fascist perfidy even more blatant. The bombs were supposed to fall on a peaceful Soviet city in complete prosperity. Contrary to popular belief, the demonstration was not addressed to the Germans, but to its own citizens.

    It also becomes clear that Stalin did not want to blur the effect by introducing a cover-up plan ahead of time.

    Unfortunately for the USSR, the aggression turned out to be real.

    However, this is only a hypothesis, as the authors themselves emphasize.

    On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at dawn, the troops of Nazi Germany, without declaring war, suddenly attacked the entire western border of the Soviet Union and carried out bombing airstrikes on Soviet cities and military formations.

    The Great Patriotic War began. They were waiting for her, but still she came suddenly. And the point here is not a miscalculation or Stalin’s distrust of intelligence data. During the pre-war months, different dates for the start of the war were given, for example May 20, and this was reliable information, but due to the uprising in Yugoslavia, Hitler postponed the date of the attack on the USSR to a later date. There is another factor that is extremely rarely mentioned. This is a successful disinformation campaign by German intelligence. Thus, the Germans spread rumors through all possible channels that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, but with the main attack directed in an area where this was obviously impossible. Thus, the date also looked like misinformation, so it was on this day that the attack was least expected.
    And in foreign textbooks, June 22, 1941 is presented as one of the current episodes of the Second World War, while in the textbooks of the Baltic states this date is considered positive, giving “hope for liberation.”

    Russia

    §4. Invasion of the USSR. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War
    At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's troops invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
    Germany and its allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) did not have an overwhelming advantage in manpower and equipment and, according to the Barbarossa plan, relied mainly on the surprise attack factor, the tactics of blitzkrieg (“lightning war”). The defeat of the USSR was planned within two to three months by the forces of three army groups (Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, Army Group Center, advancing on Moscow, and Army Group South, advancing on Kyiv).
    In the first days of the war, the German army caused serious damage to the Soviet defense system: military headquarters were destroyed, the activities of communications services were paralyzed, and strategically important objects were captured. The German army was rapidly advancing deep into the USSR, and by July 10, Army Group Center (commander von Bock), having captured Belarus, approached Smolensk; Army Group South (commander von Rundstedt) captured Right Bank Ukraine; Army Group North (commander von Leeb) occupied part of the Baltic states. The losses of the Red Army (including those who were surrounded) amounted to more than two million people. The current situation was catastrophic for the USSR. But Soviet mobilization resources were very large, and by the beginning of July 5 million people had been drafted into the Red Army, which made it possible to close the gaps that had formed at the front.

    V.L.Kheifets, L.S. Kheifets, K.M. Severinov. General history. 9th grade. Ed. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.S. Myasnikov. Moscow, Ventana-Graf Publishing House, 2013.

    Chapter XVII. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders
    The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR
    While fulfilling the grandiose tasks of Stalin's third five-year plan and steadily and firmly pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet government did not for a minute forget about the possibility of a new "attack by the imperialists on our country. Comrade Stalin tirelessly called on the peoples of the Soviet Union to be in mobilization readiness. In February 1938 in his response to a letter from Komsomol member Ivanov, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to turn a blind eye to the fact of capitalist encirclement and think that our external enemies, for example, the fascists, will not try to carry out a military attack on the USSR on occasion.”
    Comrade Stalin demanded strengthening the defense capability of our country. “It is necessary,” he wrote, “to strengthen and strengthen our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Aviation, and Osoaviakhim in every possible way. It is necessary to keep our entire people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no “accident” and no tricks of our external enemies can take us by surprise...”
    Comrade Stalin's warning alerted the Soviet people, forced them to more vigilantly monitor the machinations of their enemies and strengthen the Soviet army in every possible way.
    The Soviet people understood that the German fascists, led by Hitler, were seeking to unleash a new bloody war, with the help of which they hoped to conquer world domination. Hitler declared the Germans to be the “superior race”, and all other peoples to be inferior, inferior races. The Nazis treated the Slavic peoples with particular hatred and, first of all, the great Russian people, who more than once in their history fought against the German aggressors.
    The Nazis based their plan on the plan for a military attack and lightning defeat of Russia developed by General Hoffmann during the First World War. This plan provided for the concentration of huge armies on the western borders of our homeland, the capture of the vital centers of the country within a few weeks and a rapid advance deep into Russia, right up to the Urals. Subsequently, this plan was supplemented and approved by the Nazi command and was called the Barbarossa plan.
    The monstrous war machine of the Hitlerite imperialists began its movement in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, threatening the vital centers of the Soviet country.


    Textbook “History of the USSR”, 10th grade, K.V. Bazilevich, S.V. Bakhrushin, A.M. Pankratova, A.V. Fokht, M., Uchpedgiz, 1952

    Austria, Germany

    Chapter “From the Russian Campaign to Complete Defeat”
    After careful preparation that lasted many months, on June 22, 1941, Germany began a “war of total annihilation” against the Soviet Union. Its goal was to conquer a new living space for the German Aryan race. The essence of the German plan was a lightning attack, called Barbarossa. It was believed that under the rapid onslaught of the trained German military machine, Soviet troops would not be able to provide worthy resistance. Within a few months, the Nazi command seriously expected to reach Moscow. It was assumed that the capture of the capital of the USSR would completely demoralize the enemy and the war would end in victory. However, after a series of impressive successes on the battlefields, within a few weeks the Nazis were driven back hundreds of kilometers from the Soviet capital.

    Textbook “History” for grade 7, team of authors, Duden publishing house, 2013.

    Holt McDougal. The World History.
    For Senior High School, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 2012

    Hitler began planning an attack on his ally the USSR in the early summer of 1940. The Balkan countries of Southeastern Europe played a key role in Hitler's invasion plan. Hitler wanted to create a bridgehead in Southeastern Europe for an attack on the USSR. He also wanted to be sure that the British would not interfere.
    In preparation for the invasion, Hitler moved to expand his influence in the Balkans. By early 1941, by threat of force, he persuaded Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to join the Axis powers. Yugoslavia and Greece, ruled by pro-British governments, resisted. In early April 1941, Hitler invaded both countries. Yugoslavia fell 11 days later. Greece surrendered after 17 days.
    Hitler attacks the Soviet Union. By establishing tight control over the Balkans, Hitler could carry out Operation Barbarossa, his plan to invade the USSR. Early on the morning of June 22, 1941, the roar of German tanks and the drone of airplanes signaled the beginning of the invasion. The Soviet Union was not prepared for this attack. Although he had the largest army in the world, the troops were neither well equipped nor well trained.
    The invasion progressed week after week until the Germans were 500 miles (804.67 kilometers) inside the Soviet Union. Retreating, Soviet troops burned and destroyed everything in the enemy's path. The Russians used this scorched earth strategy against Napoleon.

    Section 7. World War II
    The attack on the Soviet Union (the so-called Barbarossa plan) was carried out on June 22, 1941. The German army, which numbered about three million soldiers, launched an offensive in three directions: in the north - towards Leningrad, in the central part of the USSR - towards Moscow and in the south - towards Crimea. The onslaught of the invaders was swift. Soon the Germans besieged Leningrad and Sevastopol and came close to Moscow. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but the main goal of the Nazis - the capture of the capital of the Soviet Union - was never realized. Vast spaces and the early Russian winter, with fierce resistance from Soviet troops and ordinary residents of the country, thwarted the German plan for a lightning war. At the beginning of December 1941, units of the Red Army under the command of General Zhukov launched a counteroffensive and pushed back enemy troops 200 kilometers from Moscow.


    History textbook for the 8th grade of primary school (Klett publishing house, 2011). Predrag Vajagić and Nenad Stošić.

    Never before had our people reacted to a German invasion except with determination to defend their land, but when Molotov, in a trembling voice, reported the German attack, the Estonians felt everything but sympathy. On the contrary, many have hope. The population of Estonia enthusiastically welcomed the German soldiers as liberators.
    Russian soldiers aroused hostility among the average Estonian. These people were poor, poorly dressed, extremely suspicious, and at the same time often very pretentious. The Germans were more familiar to the Estonians. They were cheerful and passionate about music; laughter and playing musical instruments could be heard from the places where they gathered.


    Lauri Vakhtre. Textbook “Turning moments in Estonian history.”

    Bulgaria

    Chapter 2. Globalization of the conflict (1941–1942)
    Attack on the USSR (June 1941). On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a major offensive against the USSR. Having begun the conquest of new territories in the east, the Fuhrer put into practice the theory of “living space”, proclaimed in the book “My Struggle” (“Mein Kampf”). On the other hand, the termination of the German-Soviet Pact again made it possible for the Nazi regime to present itself as a fighter against communism in Europe: aggression against the USSR was presented by German propaganda as a crusade against Bolshevism with the aim of exterminating “Jewish Marxists.”
    However, this new blitzkrieg developed into a long and exhausting war. Shocked by the surprise attack, drained of blood by Stalin's repressions and ill-prepared, the Soviet army was quickly driven back. In a few weeks, German armies occupied one million square kilometers and reached the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow. But fierce Soviet resistance and the rapid arrival of the Russian winter stopped the German offensive: the Wehrmacht was unable to defeat the enemy in one campaign. In the spring of 1942, a new offensive was required.


    Long before the attack on the USSR, the German military-political leadership developed plans to attack the USSR and develop the territory and use its natural, material and human resources. The future war was planned by the German command as a war of annihilation. On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive No. 21, known as Plan Barbarossa. In accordance with this plan, Army Group North was supposed to attack Leningrad, Army Group Center - through Belarus to Moscow, Army Group South - to Kyiv.

    Plan for a “lightning war” against the USSR
    The German command expected to approach Moscow by August 15, to end the war against the USSR and create a defensive line against “Asian Russia” by October 1, 1941, and to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line by the winter of 1941.
    On June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War began with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Mobilization was announced in the USSR. Voluntary joining the Red Army became widespread. The people's militia became widespread. In the front-line zone, fighter battalions and self-defense groups were created to protect important national economic facilities. The evacuation of people and material assets began from territories threatened by occupation.
    The military operations were led by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, created on June 23, 1941. The headquarters was headed by J. Stalin. Italy
    June 22, 1941
    Giardina, G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, Manuale di Storia. L "eta`contemporanea. History textbook for graduating 5th grade of high school. Bari, Laterza. Textbook for 11th grade of high school "Our New History", Dar Aun Publishing House, 2008.
    With the German attack on the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1941, a new phase of the war began. A broad front opened in eastern Europe. Britain was no longer forced to fight alone. The ideological confrontation was simplified and radicalized with the end of the anomalous agreement between Nazism and the Soviet regime. The international communist movement, which after August 1939 took an ambiguous position of condemning “opposing imperialisms,” revised it in favor of an alliance with democracy and the fight against fascism.
    The fact that the USSR represented the main target of Hitler’s expansionist intentions was not a mystery to anyone, including the Soviet people. However, Stalin believed that Hitler would never attack Russia without ending the war with Great Britain. So when the German offensive (codenamed Barbarossa) began on June 22, 1941, along a 1,600-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russians were unprepared, a lack of preparedness reinforced by the fact that the 1937 purge had deprived the Red Army of the army of its best military leaders, initially made the task of the aggressor easier.
    The offensive, which also included the Italian expeditionary force, which was sent in great haste by Mussolini, who dreamed of participating in a crusade against the Bolsheviks, continued throughout the summer: in the north through the Baltic states, in the south through Ukraine, with the aim of reaching the oil regions of the Caucasus .

    The Day of Remembrance and Sorrow in 2019 is celebrated on June 22. This is a memorable date for Russia. The holiday is dedicated to the date of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (WWII). In 2019, it is officially held in the Russian Federation for the 24th time. The commemorative events are attended by top officials of the state, war veterans, relatives of fallen soldiers, people who are not indifferent to the events of the war, youth and charitable organizations.

    The purpose of the holiday is to honor the heroism of the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War.

    history of the holiday

    The Day of Memory and Mourning was established by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin dated June 8, 1996 No. 857. Before this, June 22 was declared the Day of Remembrance of Defenders of the Fatherland, according to the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation dated July 13, 1992. In 2007, the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow became a memorable date in Russia.

    The date of the holiday coincides with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. On June 22, 1941, at 4 a.m., Nazi troops invaded the territory of the USSR.

    Holiday traditions

    On the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow in Russia, state flags are lowered to half-mast. Wreath-laying ceremonies are held at the memorials of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Minutes of silence are announced. The President of the Russian Federation lays a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow.

    Memorial services are held in churches for those killed during the Second World War.

    An all-Russian patriotic event “Memory Watch” is being organized. Eternal flame". Participants light a Candle of Remembrance to pay tribute to the heroism of WWII soldiers. The campaigns “Candle of Memory on June 22 - a candle of memory on my window”, “Line of Memory” are taking place. On the eve of the holiday, the “Train of Memory” campaign is held. The train with WWII veterans and youth organizations follows the route “Moscow-Minsk-Brest”. On June 22, train passengers participate in the requiem meeting “Let us bow to those great years” in the Brest Fortress. They light candles from the Eternal Flame and lower them into the Bug River.

    Charitable foundations raise money to help participants in military operations. Thematic history lessons are held in schools. Young people meet with war veterans.

    Exhibitions of military equipment are organized. Military song concerts are organized. Open-air cinemas broadcast films about the war. TV channels and radio stations are removing entertainment programs from their broadcasts.

    • As a result of the Great Patriotic War, the USSR lost 26.6 million people. 4-5 million were captured by the Nazis.

    22 June 1941 of the year

    - the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

    On June 22, 1941, at 4 a.m., without declaring war, Nazi Germany and its allies attacked the Soviet Union. Units of the Red Army were attacked by German troops along the entire border. Riga, Vindava, Libau, Siauliai, Kaunas, Vilnius, Grodno, Lida, Volkovysk, Brest, Kobrin, Slonim, Baranovichi, Bobruisk, Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol and many other cities, railway junctions, airfields, naval bases of the USSR were bombed , artillery shelling was carried out on border fortifications and areas of deployment of Soviet troops near the border from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. The Great Patriotic War began.

    At that time, no one knew that it would go down in human history as the bloodiest. No one guessed that the Soviet people would have to go through inhuman tests, pass and win. To rid the world of fascism, showing everyone that the spirit of a Red Army soldier cannot be broken by the invaders. No one could have imagined that the names of the hero cities would become known to the whole world, that Stalingrad would become a symbol of the fortitude of our people, Leningrad - a symbol of courage, Brest - a symbol of courage. That, along with male warriors, old men, women and children will heroically defend the earth from the fascist plague.

    1418 days and nights of war.

    Over 26 million human lives...

    These photographs have one thing in common: they were taken in the first hours and days of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.


    On the eve of the war

    Soviet border guards on patrol. The photograph is interesting because it was taken for a newspaper at one of the outposts on the western border of the USSR on June 20, 1941, that is, two days before the war.




    German air raid





    The first to bear the blow were the border guards and the soldiers of the covering units. They not only defended themselves, but also launched counterattacks. For a whole month, the garrison of the Brest Fortress fought in the German rear. Even after the enemy managed to capture the fortress, some of its defenders continued to resist. The last of them was captured by the Germans in the summer of 1942.






    The photo was taken on June 24, 1941.

    During the first 8 hours of the war, Soviet aviation lost 1,200 aircraft, of which about 900 were lost on the ground (66 airfields were bombed). The Western Special Military District suffered the greatest losses - 738 aircraft (528 on the ground). Having learned about such losses, the head of the district air force, Major General Kopets I.I. shot himself.



    On the morning of June 22, Moscow radio broadcast the usual Sunday programs and peaceful music. Soviet citizens learned about the start of the war only at noon, when Vyacheslav Molotov spoke on the radio. He said: “Today, at 4 o’clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country.”





    Poster from 1941

    On the same day, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 in the territory of all military districts. Hundreds of thousands of men and women received summonses, appeared at military registration and enlistment offices, and then were sent in trains to the front.

    The mobilization capabilities of the Soviet system, multiplied during the Great Patriotic War by the patriotism and sacrifice of the people, played an important role in organizing resistance to the enemy, especially at the initial stage of the war. The call “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily joined the active army. In just a week since the start of the war, over 5 million people were mobilized.

    The line between peace and war was invisible, and people did not immediately accept the change in reality. It seemed to many that this was just some kind of masquerade, a misunderstanding and that everything would soon be resolved.





    The fascist troops met stubborn resistance in battles near Minsk, Smolensk, Vladimir-Volynsky, Przemysl, Lutsk, Dubno, Rivne, Mogilev, etc.And yet, in the first three weeks of the war, the Red Army troops abandoned Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, a significant part of Ukraine and Moldova. Six days after the start of the war, Minsk fell. The German army advanced in various directions from 350 to 600 km. The Red Army lost almost 800 thousand people.






    The turning point in the perception of the war by the inhabitants of the Soviet Union was, of course, August 14. It was then that the whole country suddenly learned that the Germans had occupied Smolensk. It really was a bolt from the blue. While the battles were going on “somewhere there, in the west,” and the reports flashed cities, the location of which many could hardly imagine, it seemed that the war was still far away. Smolensk is not just the name of a city, this word meant a lot. Firstly, it is already more than 400 km from the border, and secondly, it is only 360 km to Moscow. And thirdly, unlike all those Vilno, Grodno and Molodechno, Smolensk is an ancient purely Russian city.




    The stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 thwarted Hitler's plans. The Nazis failed to quickly take either Moscow or Leningrad, and in September the long defense of Leningrad began. In the Arctic, Soviet troops, in cooperation with the Northern Fleet, defended Murmansk and the main fleet base - Polyarny. Although in Ukraine in October - November the enemy captured the Donbass, captured Rostov, and broke into the Crimea, yet here, too, his troops were fettered by the defense of Sevastopol. Formations of Army Group South were unable to reach the rear of the Soviet troops remaining in the lower reaches of the Don through the Kerch Strait.





    Minsk 1941. Execution of Soviet prisoners of war



    September 30th within Operation Typhoon the Germans started general attack on Moscow. Its beginning was unfavorable for the Soviet troops. Bryansk and Vyazma fell. On October 10, G.K. was appointed commander of the Western Front. Zhukov. On October 19, Moscow was declared under siege. In bloody battles, the Red Army still managed to stop the enemy. Having strengthened Army Group Center, the German command resumed its attack on Moscow in mid-November. Overcoming the resistance of the Western, Kalinin and right wing of the Southwestern fronts, enemy strike groups bypassed the city from the north and south and by the end of the month reached the Moscow-Volga canal (25-30 km from the capital) and approached Kashira. At this point the German offensive fizzled out. The bloodless Army Group Center was forced to go on the defensive, which was also facilitated by the successful offensive operations of Soviet troops near Tikhvin (November 10 - December 30) and Rostov (November 17 - December 2). On December 6, the counteroffensive began of the Red Army, as a result of which the enemy was driven back from Moscow by 100 - 250 km. Kaluga, Kalinin (Tver), Maloyaroslavets and others were liberated.


    On guard of the Moscow sky. Autumn 1941


    The victory near Moscow had enormous strategic, moral and political significance, since it was the first since the beginning of the war. The immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated.

    Although, as a result of the summer-autumn campaign, our army retreated 850 - 1200 km inland, and the most important economic regions fell into the hands of the aggressor, the “blitzkrieg” plans were still thwarted. The Nazi leadership faced the inevitable prospect of a protracted war. The victory near Moscow also changed the balance of power in the international arena. The Soviet Union began to be looked upon as the decisive factor in the Second World War. Japan was forced to refrain from attacking the USSR.

    In winter, units of the Red Army carried out offensives on other fronts. However, it was not possible to consolidate the success, primarily due to the dispersal of forces and resources along a front of enormous length.








    During the offensive of German troops in May 1942, the Crimean Front was defeated in 10 days on the Kerch Peninsula. On May 15 we had to leave Kerch, and July 4, 1942 after stubborn defense Sevastopol fell. The enemy completely captured Crimea. In July - August, Rostov, Stavropol and Novorossiysk were captured. Stubborn fighting took place in the central part of the Caucasus ridge.

    Hundreds of thousands of our compatriots ended up in more than 14 thousand concentration camps, prisons, and ghettos scattered throughout Europe. The scale of the tragedy is evidenced by dispassionate figures: in Russia alone, the fascist occupiers shot, strangled in gas chambers, burned, and hanged 1.7 million. people (including 600 thousand children). In total, about 5 million Soviet citizens died in concentration camps.









    But, despite stubborn battles, the Nazis failed to solve their main task - to break into the Transcaucasus to seize the oil reserves of Baku. At the end of September, the offensive of fascist troops in the Caucasus was stopped.

    To contain the enemy onslaught in the eastern direction, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko. On July 17, 1942, the enemy under the command of General von Paulus struck a powerful blow on the Stalingrad front. In August, the Nazis broke through to the Volga in stubborn battles. From the beginning of September the heroic defense of Stalingrad began. The battles were fought literally for every inch of land, for every house. Both sides suffered colossal losses. By mid-November, the Nazis were forced to stop the offensive. The heroic resistance of the Soviet troops made it possible to create favorable conditions for their launching a counteroffensive at Stalingrad and thereby mark the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war.





    By November 1942, almost 40% of the population was under German occupation. The regions captured by the Germans were subject to military and civil administration. In Germany, a special ministry for the affairs of the occupied regions was even created, headed by A. Rosenberg. Political supervision was carried out by the SS and police services. Locally, the occupiers formed the so-called self-government - city and district councils, and the positions of elders were introduced in villages. People who were dissatisfied with Soviet power were invited to cooperate. All residents of the occupied territories, regardless of age, were required to work. In addition to participating in the construction of roads and defensive structures, they were forced to clear minefields. The civilian population, mainly young people, were also sent to forced labor in Germany, where they were called “ostarbeiter” and were used as cheap labor. In total, 6 million people were kidnapped during the war years. More than 6.5 million people were killed due to hunger and epidemics in the occupied territory, more than 11 million Soviet citizens were shot in camps and at their places of residence.

    On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops moved to counter-offensive at Stalingrad (Operation Uranus). The forces of the Red Army surrounded 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the Wehrmacht (about 330 thousand people). Hitler's command formed Army Group Don, consisting of 30 divisions, and tried to break through the encirclement. However, this attempt was unsuccessful. In December, our troops, having defeated this group, launched an attack on Rostov (Operation Saturn). By the beginning of February 1943, our troops eliminated a group of fascist troops that found themselves in a ring. 91 thousand people were taken prisoner, led by the commander of the 6th German Army, General Field Marshal von Paulus. During the 6.5 months of the Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943), Germany and its allies lost up to 1.5 million people, as well as a huge amount of equipment. The military power of Nazi Germany was significantly undermined.

    The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep political crisis in Germany. It declared three days of mourning. The morale of German soldiers fell, defeatist sentiments gripped wide sections of the population, who trusted the Fuhrer less and less.

    The victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Second World War. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces.

    In January - February 1943, the Red Army launched an offensive on all fronts. In the Caucasian direction, Soviet troops advanced 500 - 600 km by the summer of 1943. In January 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken.

    The Wehrmacht command planned to conduct a major strategic offensive operation in the Kursk salient area in the summer of 1943 (Operation Citadel), defeat the Soviet troops here, and then strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and subsequently, building on the success, again create a threat to Moscow. For this purpose, up to 50 divisions were concentrated in the Kursk Bulge area, including 19 tank and motorized divisions, and other units - a total of over 900 thousand people. This group was opposed by the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which had 1.3 million people. During the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle of World War II took place.





    On July 5, 1943, a massive offensive of Soviet troops began. Within 5 - 7 days, our troops, stubbornly defending, stopped the enemy, who had penetrated 10 - 35 km behind the front line, and launched a counter-offensive. It began on July 12 in the Prokhorovka area, where the largest oncoming tank battle in the history of wars took place (with the participation of up to 1,200 tanks on both sides). In August 1943, our troops captured Orel and Belgorod. In honor of this victory, a salute of 12 artillery salvoes was fired for the first time in Moscow. Continuing the offensive, our troops inflicted a crushing defeat on the Nazis.

    In September, Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass were liberated. On November 6, formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front entered Kyiv.


    Having thrown the enemy back 200 - 300 km from Moscow, Soviet troops began to liberate Belarus. From that moment on, our command maintained the strategic initiative until the end of the war. From November 1942 to December 1943, the Soviet Army advanced westward by 500 - 1300 km, liberating about 50% of the enemy-occupied territory. 218 enemy divisions were defeated. During this period, partisan formations, in whose ranks up to 250 thousand people fought, caused great damage to the enemy.

    The significant successes of the Soviet troops in 1943 intensified diplomatic and military-political cooperation between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. On November 28 - December 1, 1943, the Tehran Conference of the “Big Three” took place with the participation of I. Stalin (USSR), W. Churchill (Great Britain) and F. Roosevelt (USA). The leaders of the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition determined the timing of the opening of a second front in Europe (the landing operation Overlord was scheduled for May 1944).


    Tehran Conference of the “Big Three” with the participation of I. Stalin (USSR), W. Churchill (Great Britain) and F. Roosevelt (USA).

    In the spring of 1944, Crimea was cleared of the enemy.

    In these favorable conditions, the Western Allies, after two years of preparation, opened a second front in Europe in northern France. On June 6, 1944, the combined Anglo-American forces (General D. Eisenhower), numbering over 2.8 million people, up to 11 thousand combat aircraft, over 12 thousand combat and 41 thousand transport ships, crossed the English Channel and Pas de Calais, began the largest war during the years airborne Normandy Operation (Overlord) and entered Paris in August.

    Continuing to develop the strategic initiative, in the summer of 1944, Soviet troops launched a powerful offensive in Karelia (June 10 - August 9), Belarus (June 23 - August 29), Western Ukraine (July 13 - August 29) and Moldova (June 20 - 29). August).

    During Belarusian operation (code name "Bagration") Army Group Center was defeated, Soviet troops liberated Belarus, Latvia, part of Lithuania, eastern Poland and reached the border with East Prussia.

    The victories of Soviet troops in the southern direction in the fall of 1944 helped the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak peoples in their liberation from fascism.

    As a result of military operations in 1944, the state border of the USSR, treacherously violated by Germany in June 1941, was restored along the entire length from the Barents to the Black Sea. The Nazis were expelled from Romania, Bulgaria, and most areas of Poland and Hungary. In these countries, pro-German regimes were overthrown and patriotic forces came to power. The Soviet Army entered the territory of Czechoslovakia.

    While the bloc of fascist states was falling apart, the anti-Hitler coalition was strengthening, as evidenced by the success of the Crimean (Yalta) conference of the leaders of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain (from February 4 to 11, 1945).

    And yet, the Soviet Union played a decisive role in defeating the enemy at the final stage. Thanks to the titanic efforts of the entire people, the technical equipment and armament of the army and navy of the USSR reached its highest level by the beginning of 1945. In January - early April 1945, as a result of a powerful strategic offensive on the entire Soviet-German front with forces on ten fronts, the Soviet Army decisively defeated the main enemy forces. During the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, West Carpathian and completion of the Budapest operations, Soviet troops created the conditions for further attacks in Pomerania and Silesia, and then for an attack on Berlin. Almost all of Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as the entire territory of Hungary, were liberated.


    The capture of the capital of the Third Reich and the final defeat of fascism was carried out during the Berlin operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945).

    On April 30, Hitler committed suicide in the Reich Chancellery bunker.


    On the morning of May 1, over the Reichstag by sergeants M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria was hoisted the Red Banner as a symbol of the Victory of the Soviet people. On May 2, Soviet troops completely captured the city. Attempts by the new German government, which was headed by Grand Admiral K. Dönitz on May 1, 1945 after the suicide of A. Hitler, to achieve a separate peace with the USA and Great Britain failed.


    May 9, 1945 at 0:43 a.m. In the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst, the Act of Unconditional Surrender of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany was signed. On behalf of the Soviet side, this historical document was signed by the war hero, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, from Germany - Field Marshal Keitel. On the same day, the remnants of the last large enemy group on the territory of Czechoslovakia in the Prague region were defeated. The day of the liberation of the city - May 9 - became the Victory Day of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The news of the Victory spread throughout the world with lightning speed. The Soviet people, who suffered the greatest losses, greeted it with popular rejoicing. Truly, it was a great holiday “with tears in our eyes.”


    In Moscow, on Victory Day, a festive fireworks display of a thousand guns was fired.

    Great Patriotic War 1941-1945

    Material prepared by Sergey Shulyak

    Information from the website hram-troicy.prihod.ru

    In 1941, Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Plan "Barbarossa" came into effect - a plan for a lightning war against the USSR, which, according to the plans of the military-political leadership of Germany, was supposed to lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union within 8-10 weeks. Having unleashed a war against the USSR, the Nazis put forward a version about the supposedly preparing invasion of Europe by the Red Army in 1941, about the threat to Germany, which, in order to protect its country and other Western European countries, was forced to start a preemptive “preventive” war against the Soviet Union. The explanation of war as a preventive measure was first given by Hitler to the Wehrmacht generals on the day of the attack on our country. He said that “now the moment has come when the wait-and-see policy is not only a sin, but also a crime violating the interests of the German people. And, consequently, throughout Europe. Now approximately 150 Russian divisions are on our border. For a number of weeks, there have been continuous violations of this border, not only on our territory, but also in the Far North of Europe and in Romania. The Soviet pilots had fun by not recognizing the border, obviously in order to prove to us that they considered themselves the masters of these territories. On the night of June 18, Russian patrols again penetrated German territory and were pushed back only after a lengthy firefight." The same was mentioned in Hitler’s address “To the Soldiers of the Eastern Front,” read out to the Wehrmacht personnel on the night of June 22, 1941. In it, military actions against the Soviet Union were allegedly motivated by “Russian offensive intentions.”

    Officially, this version was put into use on June 22, 1941, in a statement by the German ambassador F. Schulenburg, transmitted to the Soviet government, and in a memorandum presented by I. Ribbentrop on the same day to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin V. Dekanozov - after the invasion of German troops into Soviet territory. Schulenburg's statement argued that while Germany had faithfully observed the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Russia had repeatedly violated it. The USSR carried out “sabotage, terrorism, and espionage” against Germany and “opposed German attempts to establish a stable order in Europe.” The Soviet Union conspired with England “to attack German troops in Romania and Bulgaria”, concentrating “all available Russian armed forces on a long front from the Baltic to the Black Sea”, the USSR “created a threat to the Reich.” Therefore, the Fuhrer “ordered the German armed forces to repulse this threat with all means at their disposal.” A memorandum from the German government handed to Dekanozov stated: “The hostile behavior towards Germany of the Soviet government and the serious danger manifested in the movement of Russian troops to the German eastern border forces the Reich to respond.” The accusation of the Soviet Union of aggressiveness, of the intention to “blow up Germany from the inside,” was contained in Hitler’s address to the German people, read out on the morning of June 22 by Goebbels on the radio.

    Thus, the Nazi leaders, trying to justify fascist aggression, argued that they were forced to take the path of a “preventive” war against the USSR, since it was allegedly preparing to attack Germany, to stab it in the back. The version of a “preventive” strike tries to relieve German fascism of responsibility for starting the war, leads to an assertion of the USSR’s guilt for the beginning, because, as follows from its judgments, the Wehrmacht allegedly took actions that were only offensive in a military sense, but completely justified in a political sense. More broadly, according to some domestic historians, this issue also affects the problem of Nazi Germany’s responsibility for World War II.

    In a statement by the Soviet government in connection with the German attack on the USSR, these “justifications” for fascist aggression were qualified as a policy of “retroactively concocting incriminating material about the Soviet Union’s non-compliance with the Soviet-German Pact.”

    Domestic historians, revealing the origins of the version of a “preventive” war, emphasize that a similar point of view: “Germany’s war against the USSR is only preventing the impending strike of the Red Army” was also expressed by other leaders of the Third Reich close to Hitler: Rudolf Hess, Heydrich, General - Colonel A. Jodl and others. These statements were picked up by the propaganda department of J. Goebbels and for a long time were used to deceive the German people and the peoples of other countries; the idea of ​​a “preventive” war was increasingly being introduced into people’s minds. Under the influence of this and pre-war propaganda, many Germans, both at the front and in the rear, considered the war to be just, as stated in a security report on July 7, 1941, “an absolutely necessary defensive measure.”

    Hitler himself, at a meeting on July 21, 1941, stated: “there are no signs of the USSR acting against us.”

    Domestic historians who reject the far-fetched false statements of the Nazis also rely on the fact that the version of a preventive attack - the most convenient one to justify aggression - was essentially rejected by none other than Hitler himself. At a meeting on July 21, 1941, he, characterizing Stalin’s intentions, stated that “there are no signs of action (USSR. – M.F.) no against us." We emphasize that it was at this meeting that Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch received Hitler’s instructions to begin developing a plan for an attack on the USSR.

    Let us mention another very important statement by Hitler, in which he concentratedly described the fundamental motives for his decision to start a war against the USSR - it is given in the work of the German historian J. Tauber. On February 15, 1945 (the end of the war was already approaching) Hitler returned to the topic of war. “The most difficult decision of this war was the order to attack Russia,” he said. – There was no longer any hope of ending the war in the West by landing on the English islands. The war could continue endlessly; a war in which the prospects for Americans to participate in it were increasingly increasing... Time - time again and again! – everything worked against us more and more. The only way to force England to peace was to destroy the Red Army and deprive the British of the hope of opposing us on the continent with an equal enemy.”

    Please note: there is not a single word about the threat of an attack by the Soviet Union on Germany, about a stab in the back and about other arguments to justify a “preventive” attack on the USSR.

    Goebbels: “Preventive war is the safest and most convenient war, considering that the enemy must still be attacked.”

    Let's also read the notes of the Minister of Propaganda of the Third Reich, J. Goebbels. On June 16, 1941, he wrote in his diary: “The Fuhrer declares that we must achieve victory, whether we are right or wrong. We must achieve victory by any means, otherwise the German people will be wiped off the face of the earth." On July 9, in an atmosphere of euphoria from the victories of the Wehrmacht, he writes: “Preventive war is the most reliable and convenient war, if we take into account that the enemy must still be attacked at the first opportunity. This is what happened in relation to Bolshevism. Now we will beat him until he is destroyed." As they say, comments are unnecessary here.

    The version of a “preventive” war was rejected at the Nuremberg trials of the main war criminals in 1945–1946. Thus, the former head of the German press and radio broadcasting, G. Fritsche, stated in his testimony that he organized a wide campaign of anti-Soviet propaganda, trying to convince the public that “we only anticipated the attack of the Soviet Union... The next task of German propaganda was to ensure that all the time emphasize that it is not Germany, but the Soviet Union, that is responsible for this war, although there was no reason to accuse the USSR of preparing an attack on Germany.” And a number of German generals who testified at the trial did not deny this. Even Paulus, who was the developer of the Barbarossa plan, admitted that “we did not come to our attention with any facts indicating that the Soviet Union was preparing for an attack.” Field Marshal von Rundstedt said: “In March 1941, I did not have the slightest idea about the supposedly carried out (by the USSR. – M.F.) military preparations." He and other generals briefed by Hitler were surprised to hear that “the Russians are arming themselves very heavily and are now deploying troops to attack us.” According to General von Brauchitsch, during a visit to the 17th Army in June 1941, he became convinced that the grouping of Red Army forces had a pronounced defensive character.

    Map of Operation Barbarossa

    “On June 22, 1941,” the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal notes, “without a declaration of war, Germany invaded Soviet territory in accordance with pre-prepared plans. The evidence presented to the tribunal confirms that Germany had carefully developed plans to crush the USSR as a political and military force in order to clear the way for expansion to the East in accordance with its aspirations... Plans for the economic exploitation of the USSR, the mass deportation of the population, the murder of commissars and political leaders are part of an elaborate plan that began on June 22 without any warning and without legal justification. It was obvious aggression."

    The thesis about the preventiveness of an attack, as G. Kumanev and E. Shklyar rightly note, was always included in the official explanations of its actions by the Hitlerite Reich. However, the plan for the invasion of Austria was developed 4 months before the Anschluss, Czechoslovakia 11 months before its occupation, Poland 5 months before the start of hostilities, and the Soviet Union almost a year before the attack. It should be borne in mind that these countries were ready to compromise and make concessions in order not to give Germany a pretext for aggression.

    The version of a “preventive” war is completely untenable; there was an unprovoked, treacherous aggression on the part of Nazi Germany. A. Utkin believes that “in general, historiographical stars of the first magnitude on this issue agree that in June 1941, it was not a preventive war that was started, but the implementation of Hitler’s true intentions, which were ideologically motivated,” began.

    The inconsistency of the Nazi thesis about a “preventive” war has been proven quite thoroughly and in detail in many works of domestic historians. The facts they cited, based on archival and other sources, indicate that the Soviet state did not plan any aggressive actions, without intending to attack anyone. Most Russian authors convincingly show that the thesis about a “preventive” war of Germany against the Soviet Union is intended to distort the socio-political essence of the war of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany, its fair, liberating character. At the same time, they rely on documents that have long become known, indisputably testifying to the barbaric, merciless nature of Germany’s war against the USSR, the essence of which can be described in two words: conquer and destroy.

    Hitler: “Our task in Russia is to destroy the state. This is a fight of destruction."

    This demand for cruelty towards the population permeates the orders of the German command. Thus, Colonel General E. Gepner demanded: “The war against Russia... This is the long-standing struggle of the Germans against the Slavs, the defense of European culture from the Moscow-Asian invasion, a rebuff to Bolshevism. This struggle must have the goal of turning today’s Russia into ruins, and therefore it must be waged with unheard-of cruelty.”

    In 1991, the exhibition “War of Extermination. Crimes of the Wehrmacht in 1941–1944." Documentary exhibition. She demonstrated that on the basis of these orders a war of annihilation was waged against the USSR. The exhibition catalog convincingly demonstrates that the Wehrmacht was responsible for waging a war in the East in 1941–1944, “contrary to international law,” for the extermination of millions of people.

    Actions against enemy civilians committed by members of the Wehrmacht and civilians, as stated in the decree of Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht on May 13, 1941, on military proceedings in the war with the Soviet Union, will not be subject to mandatory prosecution, even if the act constitutes a war crime or misdemeanor. . This decree legitimized draconian measures against the Soviet population, essentially viewing the war with the Soviet Union as fundamentally different from all other “military campaigns” undertaken in 1939, notes German historian J. Förster. It should be considered, he wrote, “as a struggle of the Germans against the Slavs” with the goal of “destroying present-day Russia.”

    Hitler: “We don’t need Tsarist, Soviet, or any Russia”

    Specifying long-term plans, Hitler said: “It should be absolutely clear that from these areas (the captured lands. – M.F.) we’ll never leave again.” According to the Fuhrer, they represent a “huge pie” that had to be “mastered.” For an occupied country, three criteria were established: first, to take possession; secondly, to manage; thirdly, exploit. For this, “we will use all necessary measures: executions, evictions, etc.” . He put it in monosyllables: “We don’t need Tsarist, Soviet, or any Russia.”

    Goering: “In Russia, between 20 and 30 million people will die of hunger. It’s good that this will happen: after all, some nations need to be reduced.”

    What will happen to the Russians and other peoples of the country? Let us turn to the Ost master plan and the documents related to this plan. The plan itself was discovered in the German Federal Archives only in the late 80s of the last century. And it became available in digital form only in December 2009. A document drawn up by Dr. Wetzel, head of colonization of the First Main Political Directorate of the Rosenberg Ministry, dated April 1942, states: “This is not only about the defeat of the state centered in Moscow. The point is most likely to defeat the Russians as a people... from a biological, especially from a racial-biological point of view...” Let us give another excerpt from the documents that have become known: “Destruction of the biological power of the eastern peoples through negative demographic policies... Its goal is to change in the future the quantitative relationship between alien peoples and Germans in favor of the latter and thus reduce the difficulties arising from domination over them.” Hitler believed there was no point in feeling sorry for subhumans. “This year in Russia between 20 and 30 million people will die of hunger. Maybe it’s even good that this will happen: after all, some nations need to be reduced,” Goering said in a conversation with Ciano in November 1941, repeating Hitler’s thoughts. In total, in his opinion, no more than 15–30 million people should remain on Russian territory. Let the rest move to the east or die - as they please. Assessing the goals of the entire political leadership of Germany, the German historian O. Klöde writes that “not only Bolshevism, but also the Russian nation was subject to destruction... And in the case of the Slavs in general, Hitler advocated the destruction of not only another worldview, but also a foreign people.”

    An unenviable consideration awaited those who remained alive. In one of his table conversations, Hitler said: “The peoples we have conquered must first of all serve our economic interests. The Slavs were created to work for the Germans, and for nothing else. Our goal is to place one hundred million Germans in their current places of residence. German authorities should be located in the best buildings, and governors should live in palaces. Around the provincial centers within a radius of 30–40 kilometers there will be belts of beautiful German villages, connected by centers and good roads. There will be another world on the other side of this belt. Let the Russians live there as they are used to. We will take for ourselves only the best of their lands. Let the Slavic aborigines poke around in the swamp... Limit everything as much as possible! No printed publications... No compulsory schooling..."

    On the territory of the USSR it was planned to create four Reichskommissariats - German provinces. Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and a number of other cities were to be wiped off the face of the earth. In the “Military Folder,” which is one of the most detailed documents outlining the program for the exploitation of the territory of the USSR, the goal of transforming the Soviet Union into a kind of colony of Germany was formulated in completely naked form. At the same time, the attitude towards starvation of the majority of the population was constantly emphasized.

    The defeat of the Soviet Union was seen as a decisive prerequisite for establishing complete domination over the European continent and at the same time as the starting point for gaining world domination. German historian A. Hilgruber notes: “The Eastern Campaign occupied a decisive place in the overall military concept of the Nazis,” with the “successful completion of the Eastern War” they hoped to gain freedom of action “to implement their global strategy.” The famous German historian G.A. Jacobsen characterized Hitler's goals as follows: “He (Hitler. – M.F.) firmly decided to dismember Russia, mercilessly exploit and despotically oppress the “Eastern subhumans,” and also use the country for the Great German population.” After the invasion of the Soviet state and the occupation of a number of territories, the Nazis began to carry out a program of genocide against the “race of subhumans” - the Russian nation.

    All of the above quite convincingly reveals the main goals of the military-political leadership of Germany in the war with the Soviet Union. They testify to the groundlessness of the allegations about the war between Hitler and Stalin, National Socialism and European Bolshevism, drummed into the heads of the Germans by Goebbels and his henchmen and which today have found like-minded people in Russia. Victory in the war for Nazi Germany would not lead to the destruction of totalitarianism, as some neoliberal historians claim, but to the dismemberment of the country, the destruction of tens of millions of people and the transformation of the survivors into servants of the German colonists.

    Attempts to distort the nature of war today are becoming more and more cruel, evil, and aggressive

    An informed reader may ask whether it was worthwhile to reveal in such detail the goals of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR, documentary sources about what is well known to the vast majority of people who are not subject to a feeling of unkind attitude towards their people, towards their Fatherland. Apparently, it should have been, since it is precisely this aspect of the war - the most important and determining its character - that in recent years has increasingly disappeared from television screens and is silent on the radio; There is almost no information about the barbaric plans of fascism in books about the Great Patriotic War, in a number of textbooks for schools and universities. On the eve of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, attempts to distort the nature of the war, the desire to blame the USSR for almost its beginning “are becoming more and more cruel, evil, and aggressive.” What has become undesirable is removed from school textbooks, as M.V. emphasized at a round table held at the State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia in March 2010. Demurin (Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Second Class) is the most important provision of the Great Patriotic War: “the most important thing is that the Russian people fought [the battle] not for the sake of glory, but for the sake of life.” Unfortunately, the collapse of the USSR released and gave rise to forces that are interested in revising the origins and course of the Great Patriotic War. And today, 70 years after our victory over Germany, it is extremely important to comprehensively reveal the plans and goals of Nazi Germany in relation to the USSR and its people, as well as the far-reaching calculations of German fascism. They leave no room for any claims of "preventive" war on Hitler's part. The fate of not only the Soviet people, but also the peoples of the whole world depended on the outcome of the struggle of the Soviet state with Nazi Germany.

    The war on the part of the Soviet Union had a fundamentally different character. For the peoples of the USSR, the armed struggle against Germany and its allies became the Great Patriotic War for the national independence of their state, for the freedom and honor of their Motherland. In this war, the Soviet people set as their goal to help the peoples of other countries free themselves from the Hitlerite yoke, to save a dead civilization from fascist barbarism.

    All attempts, consciously or as a result of a one-sided view generated by the insufficient scientific qualifications of the authors, to rewrite and correct the past, to contribute to the distorted picture of the Great Patriotic War are ultimately futile, no matter how consonant they may be with a particular political situation.

    Fictions about war must be contrasted with the truth of history

    Of course, the most important condition for this is the need to overcome the underestimation of the positions of falsifiers, a decisive, offensive struggle against the distortion of the essence of the character of the Great Patriotic War. It is necessary to contrast the widespread and growing fictions about the war with the truth of history, based on documentary sources, to deeply reveal the victories of the Soviet troops in the grandiose battles on the Soviet-German front.